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Introduction  
Settlement of the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War has been the subject 
of much international controversy and domestic political contention in Israel over the past forty 
years. The most prominent organization advocating Israeli settlement in the territories has been 
Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful), originally established in 1974. While Gush Emunim’s 
zenith as an actual political group occurred in the mid-seventies, the term is also often used to 
describe the constellation of like-minded individuals and groups clustered around a specific 
messianic ideology, which has played an influential role in Israeli politics since 1967. The success 
of Gush Emunim, as well as its adherents and allies, in pursuing aggressive, religiously motivated 
settlement in Eretz Israel (the Biblical “Land of Israel”), can be assessed through the application 
of Social Movement Theory. Although composed primarily of figures along the religious fringe of 
Israeli society, advocates of settlement have used the political opportunities offered by elite 
divisions within the Israeli political system. The movement’s mobilizing structures have included 
state-funded religious schools, military units, and both formal and informal social networks. Their 
millenarian ideology has been framed in terms palatable to the broader Israeli public, particularly 
by relying on nostalgia for pre-state Labor Zionism, as well as arguments which claim that the 
settlements enhance Israeli security. Skillful exploitation of available political opportunities and 
mobilizing structures, coupled with clever ideological framing have allowed the movement to 
implement its program of settlement within the occupied territories in the face of substantial 
domestic and international opposition. The ensuing radicalization and terrorism of members of the 
movement can also be explained in terms of Social Movement theory, as extremists marginalized 
by the movement’s successful engagement in the political process have been radicalized and 
driven to violence by “accommodations” such as Camp David, Oslo, and Israel’s 2005 unilateral 
withdrawal from Gaza.  
Political Opportunities  
The asymmetric power of the settler groups within Israeli politics over the past forty years lies in 
their ability to exploit fissures within political elites. Over the years Gush Emunim members and 
settlement advocates have variously acted from within, or have allied themselves with, parties 
such as the National Religious Party (NRP), Likud, and Tehiya, while also engaging in “extra-
parliamentary” activities.[1] The impact of those activities has been significant, because they 
ensured that the “settlements could constrain the government” and “trump international pressure” 
in a manner unmatched by other players on the Israeli political scene.[2] The presence of the 
settlers in the volatile West Bank has ensured ability to “turn the occupied territories into hell, if 
they only want to. Therefore, even cabinets hostile to the radical right cannot afford to ignore its 
attitudes and demands.”[3] Opponents of settlement have historically proved politically weaker 
than the settlers. “They could not create facts. They could not carry out a wildcat withdrawal, or 
undo a settlement.”[4]  
Immediately after the 1967 war, the government established precedents through which motivated 
religious zealots could exploit the ambivalence of the government regarding future settlement of 
the occupied territories. Kfar Etzion, near Bethlehem, was initially approved by then-Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol’s as a “military outpost.”[5] The Kiryat Arba settlement, established in 1968 
near Hebron, set a future template for illicit settlement throughout the occupied territories, a 
process in which the “the settlers create “facts”; the government responds half-heartedly, with 
some of its ministers openly supporting the settlers; the government reaches a compromise; the 
settlers create another “fact.””[6]  
By the 1969 Knesset elections, the core individuals and groups of what was to become Gush 
Emunim perceived the opportunity to exploit the political process and pursue their religious goal 
of settlement throughout all of Eretz Israel. Their first step was to challenge the supremacy of 
NRP’s “aging, moderate leaders,” hoping to transform Israel’s leading religious Zionist party from 
an unquestioning and dependable partner of Israel’s governing Labor Alignment, to a radical 
party whose agenda was primarily driven by the goal of settlement in the territories.[7] Gush itself 
was founded to “to impose their agenda” on the NRP, and the pledge by Golda Meir’s second 
government (elected in 1973) to call new elections before any decisions were made regarding the 
territories explicitly demonstrated the decisive role of the NRP’s Gush faction.[8]  
The contentious nature of Israeli governments in general, composed of unwieldy and 
undisciplined coalitions of multiple independent lists, parties, and political fiefdoms, representing 
a variety of different (and often conflicting) interest groups during the best of times, was magnified 
under Yitzhak Rabin’s mid-seventies government, which was dominated by intense personal and 
political feuds and rivalries. The government did not maintain a unified policy, and was unable to 
“decide on what “territorial compromise” and “defensible borders” meant without risking a split.”[9] 
Gush was able to exploit feuds within the government,[10] the ambitions of politicians opposed to 
settlement if cooperation with the settlers created projects which “gave their ministries more 
responsibility,”[11] and the relative autonomy of aides and bureaucrats to execute settlement-
related policies.[12] The three leading personalities within the cabinet all worked closely with 
individuals close to the settlers: Rabin’s special advisor for defense was Ariel Sharon, Peres aide 
Yuval Ne’eman directed “Gush operations openly from the defense ministry,” and foreign minister 
Yigael Allon “was the patron of Rabbi Levinger of Kiryat Arba fame.”[13]  
Whether Peres was the decisive agent behind settlement or a rube that was exploited by settlers 
who “knew how to extract the maximum from the deep hostility between the two leaders and their 
inability to cooperate” remains debatable.[14] Peres’ biographer has argued that he encouraged 
settlement only in strategic locations far from Palestinian population centers,[15] while Rabin 
claimed that Peres encouraged “defiance of his own government’s policy” by publicly advocating 
“settlement everywhere.”[16] Rabin’s claims reflect a commonly-held belief that the Prime 
Minister was outmaneuvered by Gush and his own subordinates, particularly Peres.[17] Peres 
held “innumerable meetings” with the settlers during this era, and provided both “concrete help” 
and “symbolic support” to the movement.[18] His attitude, not particularly unique among many 
Israeli politicians of the era, is best exemplified by a statement he made during one of the many 
violent stand-offs over attempts to establish a settlement at Sebastia, near Nablus in the northern 
West Bank (Samaria), saying that “this is an illegal, unacceptable act, but these guys are not 
professional criminals or lawbreakers. They’re moved by national motives.”[19] Regardless of 
Peres’ motive in tolerating illegal settlement, his role (or that of his aides) in the military’s dilatory 
response to the Sebastia demonstrations was critical, as that slowness provided just enough 
crucial time for the settlers to organize the logistics of the demonstrations, and gain critical media 
attention.[20]  
The settlers “attributed the Likud victory in the 1977 elections to themselves and their increasing 
influence on Israeli politics.”[21] Although not from the same religious milieu as the settlers, new 
Prime Minister Menachim Begin “identified with the Gush Emunim’s combination of mystical 
attachment to areas of ancient Israel and practical steps to ensure a continued Jewish presence 
in the region.”[22] Initially, the Begin government’s friendliness with the settlers was demonstrated 
by the Prime Minister meeting with Gush’s leaders “more than with any other group of citizens in 
Israeli society.”[23] Likud’s victory “brought an end to the cautious settlement policy of the Labor 
administration,” and signaled the start of “massive settlement of the entire West Bank.”[24]  
The honeymoon period between Begin’s Labor government and Gush Emunim soon ended, 
however. Although it would be inaccurate to describe Begin’s government (or any subsequent 
Israeli government, particularly the Likud ones) as anti-settlement, he did pursue a variety of 
policies (particularly peace with Egypt) which conflicted with the specific aims of Gush’s 
religiously-inspired platform. Those programs helped cause “the religious radicals” to revert “to 
confrontation when coalition politics or diplomatic pressures led the government to slow or even 
dismantle settlements”[25]  
Gush Emunim successfully exploited political fractures within the Israeli political system, which 
were particularly pronounced during Rabin’s first government. Taking advantage of support from 
members of Rabin’s cabinet and the Likud opposition, Gush was able to achieve its goals of 
settlement in the occupied territories on their own terms, not those of a government somewhat 
sympathetic to settlement, but primarily within the context of a specific defense policy.  
Mobilizing Structures  
Religious settlers such as Gush Emunim have historically exploited multiple mobilizing structures 
to advance their political program in Israel. Despite the prominence of many of its members and 
adherents in earlier settlements established immediately after the Six-Day war, the actual Gush 
Emunim organization itself only rose to prominence during protests of Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle 
diplomacy” after the 1973 war.[26] Much of Gush’s strength then lay in its tight-knit homogenous 
core group of young (93 percent under-45 in the mid-seventies), native-born (68 percent), 
religious (92 percent), educated (66 percent post-secondary), and Ashkenazi (82 percent) 
activists. The leaders of the group came from “the same yeshivas, the same rabbis, the same 
scriptures, the same idiom.”[27] That core group used personal connections to engender support, 
bringing into the fold “people—their relatives, friends, classmates, and the like.”[28] Despite 
having a relatively small vanguard, the movement was able to tap into supportive elements of the 
Israeli population, deriving power “from the intensive reciprocal relationships between the hard 
core and the soft periphery, which at any moment could be jump-started and recruited for 
action.”[29]  
Among the most important institutions for mobilizing future members of the movement were 
religious schools, particularly the Yeshivat Merkaz Harav, and groups such as the NRP-affiliated 
youth movement Bnei Akiva.[30] Adherents of the movement historically “become part of the 
Gush usually because they grow up into it. The long process of socialization often starts at home, 
and continues through kindergarten, religious primary school, high school yeshiva, Yeshivat 
Hesder or advanced yeshiva.”[31] The “knitted skullcaps” who were graduates of Merkaz Harav 
or alumni of Bnei Akiva were then able to increase their influence within the movement itself and 
the larger religiously observant portions of Israeli society by assuming “a dominant role in the 
state-run religious school system.”[32] Religious schools were (and still are) important not only 
because they provide an opportunity to spread the ideology of settlement to the youth, but also 
because they also provide tangible assets such as buildings and vehicles, allowing the schools to 
“bus their students to right wing demonstrations and justify this on the grounds that this is part of 
the process through which their students participate in legitimate democratic activities.”[33]  
The movement also maintained its influential role in the lives of its adherents through “the hesder 
yeshivot that mixed study and army duty.”[34] These schools, “which were established beginning 
in 1964 and were granted official status two years later, offered religious youth a cadre that 
combined study and military service,” and offered a form of legitimatization for religiously 
observant Israelis that have historically felt socially-marginalized by the dominant secular Israeli 
society.[35]  
Advocates of settlement also created institutions which have existed independently both from the 
political parties that Gush Emunim aligned itself with over time, and the government bureaucracy 
tasked with establishing settlements in the occupied territories. Despite most settlement’s 
openness to non-observant residents, a few, particularly Ofra, often described as the “home of 
the settler nobility,” mandate “(i)nflexible membership rules, strict adherence to uniform 
construction, and advanced and sophisticated community management” as a “model… in its 
external appearance and its human and ideological quality.”[36] In addition, during the seventies, 
the movement used its base of support in “synagogue communities, religious PTAs, and Bnei 
Akiva alumni circles” to form branches across “the country to broadcast the message of the 
movement as widely as possible and recruit supporters and future settlers.” This network, 
operating outside of formal political circles, was maintained even after the election of an 
enthusiastically settlement-friendly Likud government in 1977.[37]  
These schools, military units, synagogues, informal social networks, and actual Gush Emunim 
institutions played a critical role in mobilizing support for the settler movement. The close-knit 
religious and social group of Gush Emunim used these structures and institutions to provide both 
ideological and logistical support to the movement, providing both a functional ideological 
framework and the actual tools which enabled successful protest.  
Framing  
The ideology of settler movements such as Gush Emunim is based on a messianic form of 
Orthodox Judaism derived from the teachings of Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook, the 
Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi in Palestine from 1921.[38] Kook was not a Zionist, but created a religious 
ideology which reconciled the secular Zionist project with messianic Judaism. That ideology, 
developed and taught by Kook and his son at the influential Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem 
for decades, “was enchantingly simple: the Land of Israel to the People of Israel according to the 
Torah of Israel.”[39] Although pursued by secular men for secular aims, the Zionist project fulfilled 
God’s will by reclaiming the Jewish inheritance. Kookist thought was compatible with secularism, 
as long as the Jews “sanctify every single acre of land that was promised to Abraham by 
God.”[40] According to Kook, “Zionism was thus a stage in God’s plan,” and the secular Zionist 
pioneers were “good sinners,” “principled evildoers,” and “the lights of chaos.”[41]  
To the Kookists, the 1967 war validated their belief in Zionism as the fulfillment of a sacred 
Jewish mission, while also providing a pragmatic justification for Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel. 
The war was not just a conflict between states, as “God had simply forced Jews to liberate their 
homeland. It was God’s will that Nasser sent his troops to Sinai, that diplomacy failed. God 
“hardened the heart of Hussein,” just as he once hardened the heart of Pharaoh to redeem the 
children of Israel.”[42] The believers’ perception of the opportunity provided by the war and the 
occupied territories differed drastically from that of Israel’s political and military leaders. Rather 
than the conquered territories serving as a buffer zone or bargaining chips in a deal for peace 
with Israel’s neighbors, the settlers wanted to “shift the focus of Israeli settlement activity from a 
strategic perspective to one that insisted on the right of Jews to colonize all areas of the region as 
part of what had been Eretz Israel.”[43]  
Despite the seeming inflexibility of Gush Emunim’s belief system, much of the movement’s 
success can be traced to its compatibility with other perspectives, particularly those of Israelis 
primarily concerned with security threats. The esoteric nature of Kookist doctrine ensures that 
“almost any empirical situation can be seen to fit the grand scheme, and no fact can confuse or 
confute the theory,” therefore allowing members of the movement to variously accommodate with 
or challenge state policies in response to their needs at any given time.[44]  
The strong religious foundation of Gush’s ideology is enhanced by its adaptability to the ideology 
of traditional secular Zionism and its use of techniques employed by the original Zionist settlers in 
Palestine. Israel’s political leaders during the 1960s and 1970s almost uniformly experienced their 
formative years in the collective settlements of the pre-Israel Palestinian Yishuv. Senior Labor 
leaders such as Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Yigael Allon equated the desire of the new 
religious settlers with their past,[45] and used the same rationale to justify settlement after the 
1967 war as that espoused by the old Zionist pioneers: “Settlers made worthless soil bloom; the 
land’s political status was so irrelevant as not to merit mentioning; settlements would actually 
push the Arabs to make peace.”[46] For the Israeli right-wing, meanwhile, the settlers 
represented “the idealism and self-sacrifice of the good old days,” and played “for them the same 
role the tiny Kibbutz movement once fulfilled for the Labor movement.”[47]  
The identification of the post-1967 generation with the original Zionist settlers established a moral 
equivalency which allowed for a range of illegal acts both by the settlers and the government. 
Since “the British government was resisted in the 1930s and 1940s by the Zionist founding 
fathers,” resistance against the Israeli state was also acceptable.[48] In the settlers’ view, 
although settlement in Samaria in the West Bank “had been declared illegal by the 
government . . . it was as legitimate as the earlier “illegal” Jewish settlement in Palestine.”[49] The 
Israeli state itself had laid the foundation for “extralegal” settlement through its own activities. The 
razing of the Mughrabi Quarter in Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 war “fit the pre-state 
strategy of the Zionist left, which believed in speaking softly and ‘creating facts’: using faits 
accomplis to determine the political future of disputed land.”[50] The establishment of a few 
settlements following the 1967 war, coupled with the “destruction of the Mughrabi Quarter and in 
the expulsion of the Bedouin from the Rafiah Plain,” made any attempts for the government to 
insist “on the rule of law” in the future as simple “hypocrisy.”[51]  
The settlers have successfully employed old Zionist rhetoric, referring to themselves as “a 
vanguard, not separatists,” using a Hebrew word for “vanguard” which “also means “pioneers,”” 
thus placing the group firmly in the tradition of the pioneers of Labor Zionism and not the 
“separatist” “Zionist right.”[52] In addition to successfully portraying themselves as the successors 
to the legitimate Zionist path, Gush leaders also created a framework for the future. The group 
provided a forum for “young religious Zionists” to overcome their previous marginalization by the 
dominant secular Israeli society and demonstrate both their “heroism in secular terms” and 
“religious greatness.”[53] It also provided a settlement ethos that better matched the post-sixties 
individualism of many Israelis than that of the old Labor socialism of the Yishuv and the post-
independence era.[54]  
One particularly effective way in which Gush Emunim and other religious advocates of settlement 
have framed their political enemies as both evil and mortally dangerous throughout Israeli history 
is through references to catastrophic events in Jewish history, particularly the Holocaust. During 
the mid-seventies, “Rabin’s concessions to Sadat were… compared to Chamberlain’s 1939 
concessions to Hitler at Munich.”[55] In his memoirs Rabin describes an author who stated that 
“Kissinger deserved to meet the same fate as Count Bernadotte, the UN mediator who was 
assassinated in Israel in 1948 (by an earlier generation of right-wing fanatics).”[56] During one of 
the series of negotiations pursued by Peres during his tenure as Prime Minister in the eighties, a 
government a lawyer told him “that a territorial concession would put him in the position of French 
General Petain, who collaborated with the Nazis in World War II and was later tried for 
treason.”[57] Similarly, after the Oslo Accords had been signed, “large segments of the religious 
right actively sought to de-legitimize both Rabin and his governing coalition by questioning their 
commitment to the Jewish nature of the state.”[58] Although “they were not the first to have used 
them,” phrases such as “Judenrein and “Auschwitz Borders”” have been commonly employed by 
groups such as Gush Emunim.[59]  
Settlement advocates such as Gush Emunim have also successfully employed the language of 
security to gain support for their actions among the Israeli public. Popular desire to retain the 
occupied territories as a security barrier after the 1967 war enabled the establishment of 
settlements before their status had been fully resolved by either appropriate international or 
Israeli authorities. A survey taken at the time indicated that 91 percent of Israelis favored keeping 
East Jerusalem, 85 percent of the Golan Heights, 71 percent of the West Bank, and 50 percent of 
Sinai.[60] Those concerns, and the notion that Israeli control of the occupied territory enhances 
Israel’s security, has since been reflected in Israeli politics, as most adherents of right-wing 
parties in Israel are not religious fanatics at all, but rather “support their politics because they feel 
unsafe in a small Israel, are suspiciously hostile of the Arabs, and distrust the nation’s moderate 
leaders.”[61] The linkage between security and settlement is demonstrated by Gush’s failure to 
successfully frame another call for settlement, this time in Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion. 
Gush calls for settlement in south Lebanon (settlement there would have been religiously justified 
within the context of Kookist thought, as this territory lay within the scope of the Biblical Israeli 
state), was roundly dismissed by the Israeli public and even most of the settler leadership, as 
civilian Israeli settlements provided little obvious security benefit, and would have been poor 
public relations for a state already faced with a hostile international community.[62] Instead, 
settlers have since emphasized the dangers of terrorism “to forge coalitions with both the right 
wing and centrist populations, for whom security and defense constitute the major issue on the 
national social and political agendas.”[63]  
Among the most critical aspects of the settlers’ success is their ability to simultaneously present 
the settlements as enhancing Israel’s security while placing few demands on the entire Israeli 
population. The movement “does not interfere with the secular majority’s way of life. It does not 
threaten transportation or soccer games on the Sabbath. It lets the majority live its own life and 
enjoy its pleasures and demands allegiance on only one issue—the settlement of Eretz Israel.”[64] 
The lack of “any intention of religious coercion,” is exemplified by the transformation of many 
settlements into suburban commuter bedroom towns with many non-religious residents.[65]  
Although Gush Emunim integrated itself into legitimate Israeli politics relatively easily, its activities 
have always involved “(p)olitical protest, illicit settlement, and civic disobedience.”[66] Forced 
evictions during the mid-seventies at Hawara, Elon Moreh, and especially Sebastia (from which 
settlers were evicted by the military seven times before a settlement was allowed at a nearby 
military base) presented images of “young skullcap-wearing settlers struggling with the 
soldiers,”[67] “hundreds of soldiers wrestling with the help of helicopters against the exhausted 
settlers,”[68] and “settlers demonstrating with their children by the roadside in the rain and in the 
cold.”[69] These images of suffering and settler victimization ultimately became fixed “in the 
archive of the collective consciousness.”[70] The Sebastia campaign itself “was designed from 
the outset as a media event in which the media became a central element, influencing the 
sequence of events,”[71] and the techniques refined at Sebastia provided a virtual playbook for 
future civil disobedience campaigns that has been used until today.[72]  
Gush Emunim at its height in the seventies successfully framed their political program to the 
Israeli public by fusing the messianic religious message of the Kooks with a settler ethic inspired 
by the secular Zionists, wrapping the result in a package palatable to a broad spectrum of Israeli 
society that would normally view adherents of those beliefs as extremists on the lunatic fringe. 
The settlers “succeeded in promoting the general impression that their world view exemplified the 
nation's most cherished values, mainly pioneer settlement and cultivation of the entire biblio-
historical Land of Israel.”[73] Simultaneously they portrayed themselves as the guarantors of 
Israel’s security, and victims of Rabin’s state security apparatus, while also evading public 
concerns with their extremist religious beliefs by not making any demands of mainstream secular 
Israeli society other than settlement of the territories.  
Radicalization  
Social Movement theory predicts that participation in the political process will “moderate” most 
radicals, in the process marginalizing an incorrigible, ideologically-committed hard-core, which 
may resort to violence in a quest for continued relevance. Likud’s 1977 Knesset victory clearly 
removed from power any effective opposition to unrestrained settlement in the occupied territories, 
as well as any future need for groups such as Gush Emunim to participate in politics. However, to 
some truly committed members of the settler movement, the subsequent Camp David Accords 
represented Likud’s betrayal of their cause, and justified violent retaliation in order to restart the 
process of redemption through the settlement of Eretz Israel. Although very few of even the most 
extreme settlers seriously believed that Sinai was a viable location for Jewish settlement, the 
most fanatical advocates of the “Whole Land” were radicalized by Israel giving Sinai back to 
Egypt. Settlement of the occupied territories has continued under both Labor and Likud 
governments since the 1977, but a hard core advocating a specific version of religious and 
messianic settlement remained after the agreement.  
Likud’s electoral success did start Gush’s decline as a social movement. Victory by the party 
advocating widespread settlement hurt the movement by removing the Rabin government as an 
enemy and focal point. Rabin’s administration which had fought settlement so ineffectively had 
provided a useful target to against which to organize.[74] In addition, the re-engagement in 
politics by Gush members under the guise of the new Tehiya Party during the eighties split the 
movement between those who supported “direct political action” in the context of a political party 
and those who preferred the old “extra-parliamentary” methods.[75]  
Menachim Begin had earlier earned the support of Gush Emunim through his rhetorical 
allegiance to the doctrine of Greater Israel before his elevation to Prime Minister, but once in 
office, he proved to be something of a moderate, willing to trade territory for peace. Engagement 
with Sadat soon “exposed” a “rift between the radical rightists and Menachim Begin,”[76] and 
Gush’s hard-core adherents remained marginal as “long as the peace with Egypt was popular 
and Begin politically in control.”[77]  
Before the eighties, despite a significant history of civil disobedience against Israeli authorities, 
Gush Emunim “had never openly embraced an ideology of violence,” instead advocating a 
utopian “peaceful and productive coexistence with the Arabs, under a benevolent Israeli rule.”[78] 
However, that attitude towards violence would soon change, with the group that would eventually 
be known as Machteret Yehudit (the Jewish Underground) first meeting in 1978 to discuss a plan 
to destroy Muslim holy sites on the Temple Mount in order to restart the process of redemption 
that peace with Egypt had stopped.[79]  
Although the operation on the Temple Mount was never undertaken, the Underground did 
conduct a series of attacks including the maiming of several Palestinian mayors in response to 
the killing of Jews in Hebron in 1980, and an attack against the Islamic College in Hebron in 
retaliation for the murder of an Israeli student in 1983.[80] The group was finally captured when 
Shin Bet interrupted an attempt to blow-up Palestinian buses,[81] although some Shin Bet 
officials have reportedly claimed that previous attempts to arrest the terrorists as early as 1980 
had been thwarted by “influential political and military officials.”[82]  
The most important operation, however, particularly in terms of its religious significance, was the 
one that never happened, the planned destruction of the Temple Mount. The Underground 
leaders did not execute the plan against the Temple Mount because none “of the individuals 
involved was an authoritative rabbi,” and “all the rabbis approached… either refused their 
blessing or were at least very equivocal.”[83] That the lack of rabbinical approval was the decisive 
factor preventing the Underground from undertaking its most cherished goal demonstrates the 
centrality of religious belief to the most radical members of the settler movement.[84]  
The aftermath of the Underground’s arrest demonstrates that poverty or ignorance does not drive 
individuals to mobilization or violence. Among convicted members of the Underground 
interviewed for a survey of terrorists, none appeared “to be particularly underprivileged or 
undereducated.”[85] The “people of the Jewish terror group did not arise from the murky margins 
of their community but in fact came from the best families of settler society and the heart of the 
believing establishment,” in particular “from the preferred and well-funded settlements, from elite 
yeshivas, and from select units in the army.”[86] The plotters either received light sentences, 
were paroled early, or if they had life sentences, “enjoyed exceptionally good conditions and went 
home on furloughs on the weekends.”[87]  
Social movement theory generally identifies radicalization as a primary driver of violence, but 
does not ignore the possibility for violence to increase in an environment already characterized by 
general instability and disorder. In addition to disenchantment with the political process after 
Camp David, the violence of the Underground can be traced to a tradition of vigilante justice 
meted out by the settlers in the occupied territories. The tradition of self-defense dates back to 
the pre-state Yishuv (the various, autonomous militias affiliated with political parties and their 
respective settlements merged and formed the Israeli Defense Force after statehood).[88] A 1983 
survey of settlers indicated that 28 percent of male (5 percent of females) settlers “participated in 
some type of vigilante activity,” and 63 percent agreed that settlers should “respond quickly and 
independently to Arab harassment,” while only 13 percent “disapproved of vigilantism.”[89] 
Regardless of whether settler vigilantism was more responsible for the Underground (or later 
attacks against both Israelis and Palestinians) than disenchantment with Camp David (or Oslo), it 
certainly played some enabling role in the violence of the nineties and beyond. One NGO’s 
investigation of Baruch Goldstein’s 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Palestinians at a mosque in 
Hebron expressed concern with settler vigilantism, indicating that "settlers seem largely immune 
from the legal consequences of criminal acts against Palestinians."[90]  
Yigal Amir justified the next major attack, his 1995 assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, on religious 
grounds, using the same logic previously used by the Underground. Amir argued that the fate of 
“a person who hands over Sacred Jewish property to the gentile” and “a person who murders or 
facilitates the murder of Jews—shall be death.”[91] Amir’s views were not unique, even after 
Rabin’s assassination, a late 1995 poll indicated that almost 5 percent of Israelis supported 
“violent protest” against the Israeli state due to the actions of the Rabin/Peres government.[92]  
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the failure of Oslo to create lasting peace, the violent fringe of 
the settler movement has remained active. In 1999, “an Israeli man was banished from Jerusalem 
after police suspected he was planning to blow up the mosques on the Haram al-Sharif.”[93] 
Adherents of the racist Kach party have “claimed responsibility for several attacks of West Bank 
Palestinians in which four persons were killed and two were wounded,” and in 2002 “the current 
leader of Kach, Baruch Marzel, was arrested by Israeli police in connection with a plot to leave a 
trailer laden with two barrels of gasoline and two gas balloons outside a Palestinian girls’ school 
in East Jerusalem.”[94] Vigilantes remain on the West Bank, with “Hilltop People” engaging “in 
violent confrontations not only with the local Arabs, but also with the Israeli military.”[95] To 
protest Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, an “army deserter” murdered 
four in “an Israeli Arab town,” while another settler in the West Bank killed four Palestinians at a 
factory in Shiloh.[96]  
The violence of the individuals and groups associated with the settler movement reflects tenets of 
Social Movement Theory. The radicals who formed the Underground were the extremist fringe of 
the movement most committed to the messianic form of the Eretz Israel doctrine, and therefore 
unable to accept peace with Egypt. The extremists of the nineties and 2000s were similarly 
unable to accept either peace with the Palestinians and Jordan or disengagement from Gaza. 
The violence of those fringe players had been enhanced by tolerance of vigilantism and settler 
defiance of state authority.  
Conclusion  
Social movement theory explains both the success of Gush Emunim in making settlement of the 
occupied territories a reality, as well as the subsequent radicalization and terrorism of extremist 
elements in the movement after its marginalization following mainstream political success. By 
exploiting the political opportunities offered by elite divisions within Israeli politics, mobilizing 
structures which include both state-sponsored institutions and informal social networks, and 
ideological framing which makes the obscure objective of messianic occupation of the “Whole 
Land” acceptable to an Israeli public primarily preoccupied with security, Gush Emunim and its 
allies have ensured settlement of the territories which both satisfies their religious obligations 
while preventing any significant withdrawal from the territories.  
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